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Abstract 
The analyses carried out within the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (SPRAs) of 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are affected by significant aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. 
These uncertainties have to be represented and quantified coherently with the data, 
information and knowledge available, to provide reasonable assurance that related decisions 
can be taken robustly and with confidence. The amount of data, information and knowledge 
available for seismic risk assessment is typically limited, so that the analysis must strongly rely 
on expert judgments. In this paper, a Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) framework for handling 
uncertainties in NPP SPRAs is proposed and applied to an example case study. The main 
contributions of this paper are two: (i) applying the complete DST framework to SPRA models, 
showing how to build the Dempster-Shafer structures of the uncertainty parameters based on 
industry generic data, and (ii) embedding Bayesian updating based on plant specific data into 
the framework. The results of the application to a case study show that the approach is feasible 
and effective in (i) describing and jointly propagating aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in 
SPRA models and (ii) providing ‘conservative’ bounds on the safety quantities of interest (i.e. 
Core Damage Frequency, CDF) that reflect the (limited) state of knowledge of the experts about 
the system of interest. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
A Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) [1] aims at 
estimating the probability of occurrence of different sizes of earthquakes that may affect the 
NPP and assesses the NPP response to such earthquakes. The results of the assessment are 
presented in terms of seismically induced Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release 
Frequency (LERF). SPRA is a multi-disciplinary activity combining the inputs and experience of 
different specialized domain disciplines, such as seismic hazard analysis, seismic fragility 
evaluation and system analysis, under the normative umbrella of risk analysis. 
All the analyses carried out in SPRA are affected by uncertainties: in general, these can be 
categorized as either aleatory or epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty reflects our inability to predict 
random observable events, whereas epistemic uncertainty represents the analyst lack of 
knowledge of the values of (constant) parameters (e.g. probabilities, failure rates,…) that are 
used in the model for a particular SPRA task. These uncertainties have to be represented 
coherently with the data, information and knowledge available, and propagated onto the risk 
measures of interest (i.e. CDF and LERF) in order to establish the level of confidence that can be 
placed in the decisions or conclusions taken, based on the results of the assessment. Then, the 
aim of analyzing the uncertainties and assessing their impact onto the SPRA results is to provide 
reasonable assurance that the decisions taken based on such results are robust, and would 
therefore not warrant reconsideration. 
In the traditional SPRA practice both types of uncertainty, aleatory and epistemic, are 
represented by probability distributions. However, the choice of a probability distribution (e.g. 
lognormal, gamma or beta) for representing epistemic parameter uncertainty due to imprecise 
and incomplete data is somewhat arbitrary and often made because of conventional reasons 
and simplifying assumptions [2]. On the other hand, various recent studies [3, 4] have 
recognized that it may be more appropriate to use a set (i.e. a family) of probability distributions 
to represent incomplete and imprecise information about a parameter, rather than a unique 
presumed probabilistic distribution. Such a family can be represented by probability boxes 
(p-boxes), possibility distributions or belief/plausibility functions within the paradigm of 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). The DST appears as an appealing framework for uncertainty 
treatment because it allows a very flexible uncertainty representation and it has a 
well-established connection to many other frameworks. In the early stages of DST, the 
application was mainly focused on data fusion and artificial intelligence [5, 6]. The studies of its 
application to complex industrial systems are still limited. Recently, a framework using the DST 
for dealing with uncertainties in the context of NPP risk analysis has been proposed and 
developed [7]. Within this framework, the intention of this paper is to demonstrate how to treat 
uncertainty using the DST in NPP SPRA. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the logic scheme of the NPP 
SPRA and the necessary basic information of each phase such as seismic hazard analysis, 
component fragility evaluation etc.. In section 3, we outline briefly the methodology for 
uncertainty treatment, demonstrate the building of the Dempster-Shafer structure for some 
simple general cases and introduce the process of Bayesian updating, when data becomes 
available. Section 4 presents the steps to build the Dempster-Shafer structure to represent the 
uncertainty of the parameters appearing in the different SPRA analyses and the framework for 
  
propagation. In Section 5, the proposed approach is practically illustrated on a simplified NPP 
SPRA model. Finally, some conclusions and perspectives are discussed in Section 6. 
  
2. Basics of NPP SPRA 
SPRA is a multi-disciplinary activity combining the inputs and experience of different 
specialized domain disciplines, such as seismic hazard analysis, seismic fragility evaluation and 
system analysis, onto a risk analysis framework [1]. Steps to perform NPP SPRA include: 
 Probabilistic analysis of the Seismic Hazards of the plant site. 
 Evaluation of the seismic fragility of the system components.  
 Construction of SPRA logic model of the NPP. 
 Propagation of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. 
For completeness of the paper, each of these steps is described briefly in the subsections below. 
 
2.1 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
A basic prerequisite for performing a SPRA for a facility located at a given site is the 
development of seismic hazard curves associated with that site. A seismic hazard curve presents 
the annual frequency of exceedance of a given threshold for different values of a selected 
ground motion parameter. Hazard curves, which are used as input data in the SPRA, are the final 
output of a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) [8], which results in the computation of 
the mean annual frequency of exceedance for the selected ground motion parameter and the 
associated uncertainty at a particular site. The uncertainty is due to both randomness (aleatory 
uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the earthquake phenomenon affecting the site 
(epistemic uncertainty). 
The hazard curves developed by a PSHA represent the aggregate hazard from potential 
earthquakes of many different magnitudes occurring at many different source-site distances. 
The conduction of a PSHA represents a substantial effort in both time and cost, and it involves 
the contributions of several specialists in the areas of geology, seismology, and geotechnical 
engineering. PSHA involves the following basic steps: 
 Identification and characterization of earthquake source zones, which are capable of 
producing significant ground motions at a specific site. 
 Construction of a model describing the temporal distribution or recurrence of earthquakes 
within each source zone, commonly expressed in terms of frequency of occurrence versus a 
measure of earthquake size. 
 Construction of a model describing the conditional distribution of the strong motion 
parameter of interest for a specific site, given the occurrence of an earthquake of given 
magnitude and distance. The predictive relationships of motion parameter for various 
source events in terms of magnitude and site distance, are referred to as ground motion 
attenuation relationships. 
 Integration of the first three steps to produce the hazard curves for the chosen site. 
Hazard curves are usually presented in terms of the annual frequency of occurrence for a 
given site versus a ground motion parameter, such as Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA). The 
presentation of the resulting curve has on the ordinate axis the logarithm of the occurrence 
  
frequency and on the abscissa axis the linear value of the ground motion parameter. The 
variability in the hazard is shown by plotting the percentiles of the hazard curve, as shown in 
Figure 2-1. For example, the 85% percentile curve defines the motion level that has a 15% 
chance of being exceeded or alternatively the level that will not be exceeded with a confidence 
of 85%. A tabular presentation (see Table 2-1) of the hazard analysis results, supplemented by a 
few hazard curves, is a preferred presentation format for PSHA results. 
Traditionally, most NPP SPRA models only use a single hazard curve (50% or mean). This 
implies treating the ground motion parameter as a random (aleatory) variable, only. The (single) 
hazard curve is, then, used to combine all calculated results of conditional core damage 
probability (CCDP) for different PGA values, to generate the CDF distribution induced by the 
seismic hazard.  
 
Figure 2-1: Example of hazard curves for PGA 
 
Table 2-1: Tabular presentation format of PSHA results 
Annual probability of 
exceedance 
PGA 
10% 50% 90% 
8.11E-01 0.0082 0.0106 0.0129 
5.57E-01 0.0149 0.0187 0.0224 
… … … … 
… … … … 
5.17E-07 0.7249 1.1804 1.6358 
2.52E-07 0.7500 1.2086 1.6673 
 
2.2 Seismic Fragility Evaluation and Estimation of Components Failure Probabilities 
The objective of a fragility evaluation [9] is to estimate the capacity of resistance of 
components with respect to a given value of the ground motion parameter. The capacity is 
represented by fragility curves. A fragility curve depicts the conditional probability of failure of 
the component for any given ground motion level. In Figure 2-2, it can be seen that the 
  
conditional failure probability of a component increases with the ground motion level to which 
the site may be subjected to, approaching 1.0 at high accelerations. 
The output of the fragility analysis is a set of three fragility parameters, the median 
capacity 	 , the logarithmic standard deviation of randomness 		  and the logarithmic 
standard deviation of uncertainty	, for each component important to seismic analysis. With 
perfect knowledge of the failure mode and parameters describing the ground acceleration 
capacity (i.e. only accounting for the random variability,	, and setting the state of knowledge 
uncertainty parameter,	, equal to zero), the conditional probability of failure, 	, for a given 
PGA value, 
, is given by: 
	 =  	( ) 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2-1)	
where	.  is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function of the term in brackets.  
The relationship between 	 and 
 is the median fragility curve, plotted in Figure 2-2 for 
a component with a median ground acceleration capacity  = 0.87g and  = 0.25. For a 
median conditional probability of failure value ranging from 5% to 95%, (- and + 1.65 logarithmic 
standard deviations of randomness), the ground acceleration capacity ranges from exp	(−1.65) to exp	(1.65), i.e. from 0.58g to 1.31g as shown in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2: Example of fragility curves for a component 
When the state-of-knowledge uncertainty   is included, the fragility at a specific 
acceleration value becomes an uncertain variable. At each acceleration value 
, the fragility is 
now represented by the subjective probability ( (also known as “confidence” ranging from 0 to 
1) of not exceeding a fragility ). The terms ( and ) are related by the following equation: 
  
′ =  + ,-./01(2) 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2-2)	
where ( = P( < )|
)  is the subjective probability (confidence) that the conditional 
probability of failure, , is lower than ) for a PGA value 
, and 67.  is the inverse of the 
standard Gaussian cumulative distribution of the term in brackets. 
For example, the conditional probability of failure ) at a PGA of 0.6g that has a 95% 
subjective probability (confidence) of not being exceeded is obtained from Equation (2-2) as 
0.79, as shown in Figure 2-2 on the 95% confidence curve. The 5% to 95% probability 
(confidence) interval on the failure probability at 0.6g is [0, 0.79]. A mean fragility curve is also 
plotted in Figure 2-2. This is obtained using Equation (2-1), by replacing  with the composite 
variability	8 = (9 + 9)7 9⁄ . 
The fragility data of components are used to evaluate the probabilities of the seismic 
damage states (SDSs), given an occurred earthquake. 
 
2.3 Construction of the SPRA logic model of the NPP 
The objective of SPRA is to assess the NPP response to earthquakes. To achieve this goal, 
we have to construct a logic model to evaluate the seismic induced CDF and LERF. In NPP 
practice, a seismic equipment list (SEL) is used to define the analysis scope of SPRA, including 
the equipment and systems required to provide protection for all seismically induced initiating 
events and the structures that house them. The structures and equipment listed in SEL are 
considered for fragility evaluation. A seismic event tree (SET) is constructed to define the SDSs 
according to the combination of headings (top events) successes and failures, given an occurred 
earthquake. 
An example of SET is shown in Figure 2-3. The headings (top events) in the SET are failures 
of structures and equipment in the SEL. The SDSs in the SET include success (OK), core damage 
(CD), and the occurrence of seismic initiating events (e.g. loss of outside power, loss of coolant 
etc.). The OK means the plant safety is not challenged by the seismic hazard and the CD means 
the plant suffers core damage given an earthquake has occurred. To evaluate the CDF and LERF 
under the seismic conditions, the frequencies of occurrence of the seismic initiating events must 
be combined with the non-seismic failure probabilities of the mitigation and safety systems still 
available after the earthquake. 
Seismic XX1 XX2 … … … XXn Seq # SDS 
       1 OK 
       
       2 LOOP 
       
       … … 
       
       … … 
       
       … LOCA 
       
       … … 
       
       … CD 
       
Figure 2-3: Example of SET 
  
Only the seismic induced impacts on the plant are considered in the SET. The success of a 
heading event in the SET (hence, the success of the equipment which the heading refers to) 
means that the equipment does not fail due to seismic ground motion. However, it may still fail 
from non-seismic failure causes. For seismic initiating events, the non-seismic failures (e.g., 
random hardware failure or operator errors) are evaluated in a separate event tree from the 
internal events accident sequence model. 
The CCDPs for each seismic initiating event are based on an internal Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) model, typically made by event trees and system fault trees. Since the CCDPs 
are seismic independent, they can be developed in advance and treated as plant level 
parameters. 
For the evaluation of non-seismic failures in the internal events model, we have to estimate 
the random failure probabilities of the components. In general, the component generic data in 
the nuclear industry is often provided in terms of the most likely value of the variable (mean) 
with a confidence interval (5% and 95% percentiles). The possible values of the parameters are 
obtained from statistical estimation methods, such as the Maximum likelihood Estimation or the 
Bayesian estimation [2]. The uncertainty associated to the parameters is generally represented 
by presumed probability distributions (such as the log-normal, gamma or beta distributions), 
which express a subjective confidence of the analyst in the possible parameter values. Such 
uncertainty treatment scheme allows Bayesian updating when plant specific data is available. 
 
2.4  Propagation of Uncertainty through the Logic Model 
The total seismic induced CDF accounts for the core damage due directly to the seismic 
hazard and the core damage resulting from the accident sequence that developed from the 
seismic initiating events. The overall seismic risk quantification process presented in Figure 2-4 
shows the propagation of uncertainty through the logic model under assessment.  
The first step of performing the risk quantification is top event evaluation. In this step, the 
fault tree associated with each top event (heading) included in the SET is used to determine the 
conditional probability of the top event. This is done over a specific interval of ground motion 
values that the plant site may be subjected to. The individual component conditional failure 
probabilities for each top event are combined to determine the conditional probability of the 
top event: this is referred to as top event level fragility curve for each top event. 
The second step is the SET sequence quantification. In this step, we compute the sequence 
level fragility curves for each sequence defined in the SET according to the combination of top 
events along the sequence. As top events, the sequence level fragility curves are calculated over 
a specific interval of ground motion that the plant site may be subjected to. 
The third step is the quantification of the core damage probability induced by seismic 
initiating event sequences. In this step, the sequence level fragility curves for each seismic 
initiating event are combined with the associated non-seismic event tree CCDP distribution to 
generate the core damage fragility curves. These core damage fragility curves of seismic 
initiating events are, then, combined with the sequence level fragility curves of core damage 
directly induced by the seismic hazard, to get the plant level core damage fragility curves. 
  
The final step is the estimation of the CDF: the plant level fragility curves are combined 
with the seismic hazard curves to fulfill the seismic risk assessment. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: SPRA Process 
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3. Basics of DST and Possibilistic Bayesian Updating Process 
It is claimed that the data, information and knowledge typically available for the analysis 
involved in NPP SPRA is typically limited and challenge a (single distribution) probabilistic 
treatment of epistemic uncertainty. Then, the main purpose of this paper is to show the 
treatment of uncertainty by DST in NPP SPRA based on data information and knowledge 
available. Since plant specific data brings information for uncertainty analysis, we consider also 
Bayesian updating. In this section, we outline briefly the DST and Bayesian updating. 
 
3.1 Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The DST of evidence [10], also known as the theory of belief functions, is a generalization of 
the Bayesian theory of subjective probability in that it allows less restrictive assumptions about 
the likelihood, than in the case of a probabilistic characterization of uncertainty. 
The DST is a mixed representation, which combines the probabilistic representation and the 
interval representation in a single representation. Over the set of the real numbers, the DST 
resembles a discrete probability theory except that the locations at which the probability mass 
resides are sets of real values, rather than precise points. These sets associated with non-null 
mass are called focal elements. Typically, focal elements are chosen among closed intervals also 
called focal intervals. The correspondence of probability masses associated with the focal 
intervals is called the basis belief assignment (BBA), noted m. In the DST, this BBA on the real 
line is a mapping such that <: 2ℝ → 0,1 where <(∅) = 0 and	∑ <() = 1B⊆ℝ , for all 
subsets  of ℝ. The BBA for a given set can be understood as the weight of evidence that the 
truth is in that set, evidence which cannot be further subdivided on the basis of the data 
information and knowledge available. Unlike a discrete probability distribution where the mass 
is concentrated at distinct points, the focal intervals in DST may overlap one another (see on 
Figure 3-1). As can be seen in this Figure, the uncertainty associated with an epistemic variable X 
can be represented by the so-called Dempster-Shafer structure as: 
D(
7, E7,<7), (
9, E9,<9),… , (
, E,<)G    (3-1) 
where 
H ≤ EH , ∑ <HHJ7 (
H, EH) = 1  and 
H,	EH ⊆ ℝ		∀1 ≤ L ≤ M . The Dempster-Shafer 
structure is, thus, a collection of pairs consisting of closed intervals and corresponding BBAs. 
From a computational point of view, this construction is helpful for propagating the uncertainty 
through a given model function by simulation. 
 
Figure 3-1: An example of belief and plausibility functions 
  
Associated with each BBA are two functions, NOP and QP, which are referred to as belief 
and plausibility functions. The belief and plausibility functions of uncertain variable R 
belonging to a subset SE, ET ⊆ ℝ are defined as: 
NOPUR ∈ SE, ETW = ∑ <(
H, EH)XY,ZY⊆Z,Z      (3-2) 
QPUR ∈ SE, ETW = ∑ <(
H, EH)XY,ZY⋂Z,Z\∅      (3-3) 
The belief function NOPUR ∈ SE, ETW represents the degree of belief, based on the available 
evidence (e.g., given focal intervals	
H,	EH), that the true value of variable R belongs to	SE, ET. 
On the other hand, the plausibility function QPUR ∈ SE, ETW can be interpreted as the total 
evidence that the true value of variable R belongs not only to	SE, ET, as for NOPUR ∈ SE, ETW, 
but also to any other given focal interval which overlaps with E, E. When the focal intervals 
are reduced to precise values, the belief and plausibility functions coincide with the cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) of probability theory. 
The belief and plausibility functions are recognized to be the lower and upper bounds of 
the cdf. In fact, according to the imprecise probabilities theory [11], the imprecision in the 
cumulative distribution function is characterized by lower and upper cdfs	], ] (named a 
p-box), such that 	](^) ≤ ](^) ≤ ](^)  where 	](^) = P(R ≤ ^ ) is the cdf (probabilistic). 
Given a Dempster-Shafer structure as in Equation (3-1), these two functions are equated with 
the cumulative belief and plausibility functions and defined as: 
](^) = NOP(R ∈ (−∞, ^) = ∑ <(
H, EH)ZY`a,			HJ7 	 	 	 (3-4)	
](^) = QP(R ∈ (−∞, ^) = ∑ <(
H, EH)XY`a,			HJ7 	 	 	 (3-5)	
Thus, we can see that the (probabilistic) cdf ](^) = Q(R ≤ ^)  is bounded by the 
cumulative belief and plausibility functions see Figure 3-2. Inversely, since a unique p-box,	], ], 
can induce many Dempster-Shafer structures, in practice a Dempster-Shafer structure is often 
approximately obtained using discretization techniques [12]. 
 
Figure 3-2: Cumulative belief and plausibility functions 
  
 
The DST is also related to the possibility theory which can be seen as an extension of the 
fuzzy set theory. In the possibility theory, uncertainty is represented by a possibility distribution 
which is equivalent to the belief functions of DST when the focal intervals are nested. Therefore, 
it is recognized that the possibility theory is a special case of the DST [13]. The relationship 
between the possibility theory and the DST is very important for the Bayesian updating process, 
as we shall see in section 3.3 below. 
 
3.2 Building Dempster-Shafer structure based on available information  
In the absence of specific data, precise information and sure knowledge, it seems more 
reasonable to specify a possible range of values for a variable rather than a single, point value. 
To clarify this, in the following, we consider a handful of examples of commonly encountered 
situations. Suppose, for example, that it is known that an uncertain parameter cannot be smaller 
than 
	nor larger than	E: then, the interval 
, E is used and the associated Dempster-Shafer 
structure is		D(
, E,1)G (Figure 3.3). If the median b of an uncertain variable is also known, 
this pinches the uncertainty distribution to a definite point at the 50% probability level. As 
shown in Figure 3-3, the associated Dempster-Shafer structure for this case 
is		D(
, b, 0.5), (b, E, 0.5)G. Having reliable knowledge of other percentiles would correspond 
to similar structures. The focal intervals in this case do not overlap. 
   
Figure 3-3: Dempster-Shafer structure based on range and median value 
If in addition to the range, the mean of a random variable is also known, the p-box can be 
further refined. Let 		^Hc , ^  and ^def  be the minimum, mean and maximum values 
respectively. First, consider the ^-values between the minimum and the mean. The upper bound 
on probability over this range can be found by determining the largest possible values attained 
by a distribution function under the specified constraints [12]. Consider an arbitrary value		^ ∈S^Hc , ^T, the value g of a distribution function at ^ represents the probability mass at and 
to the left of		^. The probability mass on the left must be balanced by the mass on the right of 
the mean. The greatest possible mass would be balanced by assuming that the rest of the 
probability,	1 − g, is concentrated at ^def. Likewise, the arrangement of mass on the left side 
requires the least balance when it is all concentrated at the point	^. These considerations lead to 
the expression which can be solved to yield		g^ + (1 − g)^def = ^, which can be solved to 
yield	g = (^def − ^)/(^def − ^), specifying the largest value of the distribution function for 
the value	^. If there were any more probability mass at values less than or equal to	^, the 
constraint of the mean could not be satisfied by any arrangement of mass at values less than or 
equal to	^def. Clearly, then, the spike distributions defined by this expression describe the 
b a 
0 
1 
<(
, E) = 1.0 
<(b, E) = 0.5 
<(
, b) = 0.5 
b c a 
0 
1 
0.5 
  
 
bounding distribution over the range	S^Hc , ^T, subject to the fundamental constraint		0≤g≤1. 
The position of the lower bound is determined by the degenerate distribution which has all its mass 
at the mean. Its distribution function is zero from ^Hc to	^. Lower and upper bounds for values 
larger than ^  can be derived by similar (but inverted) arguments. The resulting p-box is, 
then,		], ], where 
](^) = i a6aa6aYjk 								∀^ ∈ ^, ^def				0													∀^ ∈ ^Hc , ^ 	 	 	 	 	 (3-6) 
](^) = i					1													∀^ ∈ ^, ^defalmn6aalmn6a 					∀^ ∈ ^Hc , ^      (3-7) 
The belief and plausibility functions of this case are plotted in Figure 3-4. As shown in 
Figure 3-4, the associated Dempster-Shafer structure can be obtained by canonical discretization 
[12]. 
 
Figure 3-4: Dempster-Shafer structure based on range and mean 
 
3.3 Possibilistic Bayesian Updating Process  
The possibilistic Bayesian updating process has already been proposed in the literature [14]. 
As mentioned in the previous section, in possibility theory, uncertainty is represented by a 
possibility distribution which is equivalent to the belief functions of the DST when the focal 
intervals are nested. We can transform the belief and plausibility functions of parameter R, 
obtained based on industry generic data, to an equivalent possibility distribution and embed the 
possibilistic Bayesian updating process based on plant specific data into the uncertainty analysis 
framework. In the following, we briefly summarize the possibility theory and address how to 
transform the belief and plausibility functions in a possibility distribution, and introduce the 
process of Bayesian updating of possibility distributions when new information is available. 
Possibility theory [15] is relevant to represent consonant imprecise knowledge. The basic 
notion is the possibility distribution, denoted	o, an upper semi-continuous mapping from the 
real line to the unit interval. A possibility distribution describes the more or less plausible values 
of some uncertain parameter		R. Possibility theory provides two evaluations of the likelihood of 
    ^ Hc     ^      ^ def 
belief function 
plausibility function 
  
 
an event, for instance whether the value of a real variable	R lies within a certain interval: the 
possibility Π and the necessity p are defined as: 
Π() = qrga∈Bo(^)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3-8)	
p() = 1 −Π() = LMa∉BU1 − o(^)W	 	 	 	 (3-9)	
A unimodal numerical possibility distribution may also be viewed as a nested set of 
confidence intervals, which are the u-cuts 	S^v, ^vT = D^, o(^) ≥ uG of o. The degree of 
certainty that S^v , ^vT contains R is pUS^v, ^vTW = 1 − u (if o is continuous). Conversely, 
a nested set of intervals H  with degrees of certainty xH that H  contains R is equivalent to 
the possibility distribution o(^) = min	D1 − xH, ^ ∈ H , L = 1…MG  provided that 		xH  is 
interpreted as a lower bound on		p(H), and o is chosen as the least specific possibility 
distribution satisfying these inequalities [16]. 
We can interpret any pair of dual functions necessity/possibility p,Π as upper and 
lower probabilities induced from specific probability families. 
Let o be a possibility distribution inducing a pair of functions		p,Π. We define the 
probability family	Q(π) = Dg, ∀	measurable,	p()≤	g()G = Dg, ∀	measurable,	g()≤Π()G. 
In this case, qrgf∈}(~)g() = Π() and LMf∈}(~)g() = p() hold. In other words, the 
family Q(π) is entirely determined by the probability intervals it generates. 
Suppose pairs (interval H, necessity weight xH) supplied by an expert are interpreted as 
stating that the probability g(H) is at least equal to	xH where H  is a measurable set. We 
define the probability family as follows: Q(π) = Dg	, ∀H , xH≤	g()G. We thus know that g = Π 
and g = p. 
For a unimodal continuous possibility o  with core D
G  (i.e. Π(D
G) = o(
) = 1 
and 	∀^ ≠ 
, o(^) ≠ 1), the set of probability measures Q(o)  can be more conveniently 
described by a condition on the cdfs of these probabilities, that is Q(o) = 	 Dg	, ∀^, , ^	≤	
	≤	,](^)	+	1	−	]()	≤	<
^(π(^),π())G. Note that we can choose ^ and  such that		π(^) =
π() in the expression of		Q(o), i.e. suppose that		^,	 is a cut of		o. If v is the u-cut of		o, 
it holds that Q(o) = 	 Dg	, g(v)≥p(v), ∀u	∈	(0,1G. 
Considering a particular probability box S], ]T such that ](^) = Π	(R	∈	(−∞, ^) and ](^) = p	(R	∈	(−∞, ^), it is clear that 
](^) = 					0																							for	^	≤
1 − π(^)														for	^	≥
		 	 	 	 (3-10) 
](^) = 				π(^)																		for	^	≤
					1																							for	^	≥
    (3-11) 
The probability box S], ]T above has an important specific feature; there exists a real 
value 
 such that ](
) = 1 and ](
) = 0. It means that the p-box contains the deterministic 
value 
, so that the two cdfs are acting in disjoint areas of the real line separated by this value. 
  
 
We can retrieve a possibility distribution from such two cdfs as π = <LM	(], 1−	]) and, thus, 
retrieve the possibility distribution that generated the p-box. 
Once we use Equations (3-6) and (3-7) to build the belief and plausibility functions of 
parameter R based on industry generic data expressed in a form <, µ, , where µ is the 
mean and <,  are, respectively, the lower bound and the upper bound, we can transform 
them to a prior possibility distribution such that π(^) = ( − µ)/( − ^) for ^ ∈ <,µ and 
π(^) = 1 − (^ − µ)/(^ − ) for ^ ∈ µ, , as we discussed above. The prior possibility 
distribution is a unimodal continuous distribution with core {µ}. 
The objective of Bayesian updating is to calculate the posterior possibility distribution 
π(^|) of R after   is obtained. To this aim, we employ a method based on a purely 
possibilistic counterpart of the classical, probabilistic Bayes’ theorem [17]: 
π(^H|) = π(aY|)π(aY)	π(aY|)π(aY) 						for	L = 1…M	 	 	 	 (3-12) 
where π(^H|) is the possibilistic likelihood of the parameter R given the newly observed 
data , and quantities π(^|)	and π(^) are defined above. Notice that <
^π(^H|)π(^H) 
is a normalization factor such that		<
^π(^|) = 1, as required by possibility theory [18]. 
The posterior possibility distribution π(^|)  thereby obtained is also a unimodal 
continuous distribution. Then, we can obtain the corresponding belief and plausibility functions 
using Equations (3-10) and (3-11). 
 
  
  
 
4. DST of Evidence for Uncertainty Representation and Propagation in NPP SPRA 
The construction of belief functions within the DST does not rely on any assumption and is 
carried out directly from the original data. In this section, we describe the typical characteristics 
of the data available for SPRA and show how to build Dempster-Shafer structures based on this 
(limited) information. 
 
4.1 Building Dempster-Shafer structure of Seismic Hazard Curves 
As mentioned earlier, most NPP SPRA models use only a single hazard curve (50% 
percentile or mean); this implies that we treat the ground motion parameter (i.e. PGA) as a 
random (aleatory) variable, only. However, the seismic hazard experts provide more than one 
hazard curve to represent the uncertainty bounds based on their knowledge; we can, then, build 
the corresponding Dempster-Shafer structures for the ground motion parameter (i.e. PGA) 
following these steps: 
 Transform each hazard curve to a PGA cumulative density function, given an earthquake 
has occurred. 
 Discretize the lower (i.e. 10%) and upper (i.e. 90%) PGA cumulative density functions to 
generate the focal intervals and corresponding masses (notice the focal intervals may 
overlap). 
 Subdivide each focal interval by another percentile (e.g. 50%) PGA cumulative density 
function and distribute the mass of each focal interval to the two (new) focal intervals 
thereby originated; the subdivided focal intervals in each focal interval will not overlap as 
shown on Figure 3-3. 
 Integrate all subdivided focal intervals to build the final Dempster-Shafer structure.  
As mentioned in section 2.1, the ^% percentile curve defines the motion level that we are ^% confident that it will not be exceeded. If the bounding curves (i.e. ^ = 0 and	^ = 100) exist, 
we can define the uncertainty bound. Unfortunately, this is not always true in practice; in this case, 
we can take the lowest (e.g. 10%) and highest (e.g. 90%) as bounds, and this is the only assumption 
we make in the whole analysis framework. The process of converting the hazard curve to a cdf and, 
then, building the Dempster-Shafer structure will be shown in section 5. 
 
4.2 Building the Dempster-Shafer structure of Seismic Fragility Curves 
Traditionally, most NPP SPRA models use mean fragility curves to represent the conditional 
failure probability of a component. For a given PGA value, the conditional failure probability 
calculated by Equation (2-1) (replacing  with	8) is just a point value. This implies that the 
component fragility parameters do not contribute to the epistemic uncertainty. For a given PGA 
value, the conditional failure probability, calculated by Equation (2-2), is a single curve, which 
means that we have perfect knowledge about the probability and we can treat fragility as a 
random (aleatory) variable. However, for a given PGA focal interval	
, 
, we can directly 
build the Dempster-Shafer structure of the component failure probability based on	,		, and  by Equation (2-2). 
  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Example of DST structure for component failure probability 
Figure 4-1 is an example of the Dempster-Shafer structure of component conditional failure 
probability, given the PGA focal interval [0.2g, 0.3g]. The number of component failure 
probability focal intervals is 20 and the mass of each is 5%. The lower bound is calculated by 
setting confidence level (=[0.005, 0.05, 0.1,…, 0.95] and the upper bound is calculated by 
setting confidence level (=[0.05, 0.1,…,0.95, 0.995]. 
 
4.3 Building the Dempster-Shafer structure of Component Failure Probabilities 
The generic data of component reliability provided by industry data banks usually contain 
mean values and presumed distribution parameters. Thus, the data of an input parameter R 
can be typically expressed in a form <,µ,  , where µ  is the mean and <,   are, 
respectively, the lower bound and the upper bound. The value of < and  can be obtained 
directly from the 5% and 95% percentiles of the 90% confidence interval. Hence the 
Dempster-Shafer structure of the parameter based on generic data can be built by Equation (3-6) 
and (3-7), as shown in Figure 3-4. 
In the traditional PRA practice, collected plant specific data is used to provide more 
information to reduce the uncertainty in the parameter estimate. In case we use the 
Dempster-Shafer structure to represent the epistemic uncertainty in the parameters, the plant 
specific data is used to reduce the epistemic uncertainty and narrow down the focal intervals 
using the method described in section 3.3. 
 
4.4  Uncertainty Propagation through the Logic Model 
This step consists of propagating the uncertainty in the input parameters (seismic hazard 
curves, seismic fragility curves, component failure probabilities,…) through the logic model of 
the system (i.e. the SET) in order to estimate the CDF of the NPP of interest. In the 
Dempster-Shafer framework, the propagation of uncertainties is not as straightforward as for 
the probabilistic approach as it consists of propagating focal intervals. When the input 
parameters are independent, the uncertainties are propagated by performing the Cartesian 
product of the input focal intervals and propagating them, the probability mass of the resulting 
 = 0.87  = 0.25 β = 0.35 
  
 
output focal intervals is obtained using the product of the probability masses of the input 
intervals.  
  
 
5. Case Study 
In this section, we refer to a simplified model to demonstrate the whole SPRA uncertainty 
assessment process. The scheme of the hypothetical (simplified) NPP sketched in Figure 5-1 is 
located in a seismic area characterized by the seismic hazard curves of Figure 5-2 [19]. The 
fragility curves parameters for the 14 components of the simplified NPP are given in Table 5-1 
[20], and the components generic and specific data available is provided in Table 5-2 [2, 21]. 
  
Figure 5-1: Simplified NPP layout 
 
Figure 5-2: Seismic hazard curves 
Table 5-1: Parameters of component fragility curves 
 
Structure/Component     
OSP Offsite Power Transformers 0.3 0.39 0.39 
EDGDT Fuel Oil Day Tank 2.33 0.36 0.38 
EDGDG Emergency Diesel Generator 3.4 0.33 0.39 
EDGST DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2.39 0.18 0.13 
EDGFP EDG Fuel Transfer Pump 6.9 0.29 0.31 
EDGSA EDG Starting Air Receivers 8.58 0.3 0.42 
CST Condensate Storage Tank 1.1 0.33 0.33 
HPCPI High Pressure Injection System Piping 4.02 0.38 0.43 
HPCPP High Pressure Injection System Pumps 4.75 0.31 0.41 
SRV Safety Relief Valve 3.8 0.43 0.43 
RHRPI RHR System Piping 4.02 0.38 0.43 
RHRPP RHR Pumps 3.48 0.31 0.41 
RHRHX RHR Heat Exchangers 8.8 0.38 0.46 
  
 
Table 5-2: Component reliability data 
Basic 
Event 
Industry Data Specific Data 
5% mean, 95% # of failure # of demand  (running hours) 
AVD 6.0E-5 1.2E-3 4.0E-3 7 8844 
MVD 8.0E-5 1.0E-3 3.0E-3 9 9052 
PMA 6.0E-5 1.5E-3 5.0E-3 9 4538 
PME 5.0E-5 4.0E-4 1.0E-3 2 3329.8h 
HR-ADS 1.3E-4 3.4E-3 1.3E-2 -- -- 
The corresponding SET is shown in Figure 5-3: OSP is offsite power system; EDG represents 
emergency diesel generator system including day tank (EDGDT), diesel generator (EDGDG), fuel 
storage tank (EDGST), fuel transfer pump (EDGFP) and starting air receiver (EDGSA); CST is the 
condensate storage tank; HP represents high pressure coolant injection system including system 
piping (HPCPI) and pump (HPCPP); SRV represents the safety relieve valve and LP represents low 
pressure coolant injection system including system piping (RHRPI), pump (RHRPP) and heat 
exchanger (RHRHX). 
Seismic OSP EDG CST HP SRV LP Seq # SDS 
       1 OK 
       
       2 LOOP1 
       
       3 CD 
       
       4 LOOP2 
       
       5 CD 
       
       6 CD 
       
       7 CD 
       
       8 CD 
       
Figure 5-3: Seismic Event Tree 
There are 8 sequences in the SET. Notice that since the median capacity		 of the OSP is 
much smaller than the others (see Table 5-1), if the offsite power system survives after the 
earthquake, it is very likely that the other systems also survive. Thus, even if a transient occurs 
under this condition, there are still many safety systems that can mitigate the transient and can 
lead the reactor to a safe state. Thus, the final plant state for sequence 1 is set directly to ‘OK’ in 
case of OSP success (Sequence 1). Instead, if the OSP and EDG fail simultaneously (Sequence 8), 
we conservatively assume that the core will be damaged, although there are some additional 
safety systems that can intervene. 
The other sequences reflect the scenarios possibly generated by the LOOP event. The SDS 
of Sequences 3, 5, 6 and 7 are ‘CD’ due to loss of coolant injection (Sequences 5, 6 and 7) or long 
term cooling (Sequence 3). Since Sequence 2 (LOOP1) and Sequence 4 (LOOP2) still have other 
systems available to mitigate the seismic events, they must be combined with the internal event 
trees to consider the contribution of non-seismic failures. 
 
 
  
 
5.1 Seismic Hazard Curves 
A tabular presentation of the hazard curves (Figure 5-1) is also provided by the seismic 
hazard experts [19]. There are 166 point values for each hazard curve, partially shown in Table 
5-3 (first 12 and last 10 points). The high-confidence-of-low-probability-of-failure (HCLPF) 
capacity of the weakest component (i.e. OSP) is 0.083g. This means that we can assume the 
reactor still operates normally when the ground motion is lower than this value. From this point 
of view, the annual probability of exceedance of the ground motion threshold is 6.80E-2 (see the 
tenth row of Table 5-3), since the PGA value of the 90% hazard curve is the first one larger than 
0.083g. The lower bound of PGA value, then, is determined by the 10% hazard curve (i.e. 
0.0529g) and the upper bound is set to the maximum PGA value (i.e. 1.6673g) that the plant site 
may be subjected to according to the seismic hazard experts. 
Table 5-3: Tabular data of hazard curves 
Annual probability of 
exceedance 
PGA (g) 
10% 50% 90% 
8.11E-01 0.0082 0.0106 0.0129 
5.57E-01 0.0149 0.0187 0.0224 
3.81E-01 0.0213 0.0264 0.0314 
2.71E-01 0.0269 0.0334 0.0398 
2.01E-01 0.0321 0.0400 0.0479 
1.54E-01 0.0368 0.0463 0.0557 
1.22E-01 0.0412 0.0522 0.0633 
9.85E-02 0.0452 0.0580 0.0708 
8.11E-02 0.0492 0.0637 0.0782 
6.80E-02 0.0529 0.0691 0.0854 
5.77E-02 0.0564 0.0745 0.0926 
4.94E-02 0.0599 0.0799 0.0998 
… … … … 
3.18E-06 0.6355 1.0532 1.4710 
2.79E-06 0.6433 1.0654 1.4875 
2.41E-06 0.6516 1.0781 1.5047 
2.06E-06 0.6605 1.0916 1.5228 
1.72E-06 0.6702 1.1060 1.5419 
1.39E-06 0.6810 1.1216 1.5623 
1.09E-06 0.6930 1.1387 1.5844 
7.95E-07 0.7072 1.1580 1.6087 
5.17E-07 0.7249 1.1804 1.6358 
2.52E-07 0.7500 1.2086 1.6673 
As explained in section 4.1, in order to build the Dempster-Shafer structure for the hazard 
curves, first we transform each hazard curve into a PGA cdf conditional on the seismic event. 
This is achieved by calculating the frequencies between two neighborhood PGA point data and, 
then, normalizing them by the annual probability of exceedance of the ground motion (i.e. 
6.80E-2) to obtain the probability densities of the PGA intervals. For example, according to the 
10% hazard curve data in Table 5-3, the frequency between 0.0529g and 0.0564g is 1.03E-2 (= 
6.80E-2 − 5.77E-2) and the probability density of this PGA interval is 1.51E-1 (1.03E-2/6.80E-2). 
After calculating the probability density for each interval, we can integrate them and obtain the 
corresponding cdfs as Figure 5-4. 
  
 
 
Figure 5-4: PGA cdfs corresponding to the seismic hazard curves of Figure 5-2 
Using the lower (i.e. 10%) and higher (i.e. 90%) PGA cdfs, we can generate the related 
Dempster-Shafer structure, i.e. the focal intervals and the corresponding masses (BBA) (solid 
lines in Figure 5-5). Then, using the additional information about the median, these focal 
intervals are further subdivided by the 50% curve and the Dempster-Shafer structure is 
reconstructed accordingly, as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 5-5. 
 
Figure 5-5: Dempster-Shafer structure of the seismic hazard curves 
 
5.2 Conditional Failure Probability of Top Events 
There are six top events in the SET (see Figure 5-3). In this step, the fragility curves of each 
component are used to construct the Dempster-Shafer structure for each top event probability. 
First of all, we represent the component fragility curves by Dempster-Shafer structures. As 
described in section 4.2, we can use fragility curves to calculate the bounds of each focal 
element and, then, build the Dempster-Shafer structure of the component failure probability 
given each PGA value of interest. An example of component fragility interval curves (OSP) is 
shown in Figure 5-6. In this Figure, the 5%, 50% and 95% percentile curves are shown, for a 
given PGA value. For comparison, the fragility curves calculated by Equation (2-2) are also 
plotted. 
  
 
 
Figure 5-6: Dempster-Shafer structure of the failure probability of component OSP for different 
PGA values 
There are three top events consisting of only one component (i.e. OSP, CST and SRV): in this 
case, the top event level fragility interval curves are the same as the component fragility interval 
curves. For the other three top events (i.e. EDG, HP and LP), all the components fragility interval 
curves have to be propagated through the corresponding Fault Tree to get the top event level 
fragility interval curves. In this paper, the propagation has been carried out by standard Monte 
Carlo Simulation (MCS). The Dempster-Shafer structure corresponding to a given PGA value is, 
then, reconstructed according to the calculated focal intervals. An example of top event 
probability interval curves (for top event EDG) is shown in Figure 5-7; notice that the single 
fragility curve in the Figure (solid line) is the result of the traditional method combining the 
mean fragility curve (corresponding to parameters 	and 8) of each component. 
 
Figure 5-7: Dempster-Shafer structure for the probability of top event EDG 
 
5.3 Conditional Probability of SDSs 
This step propagates the fragility curves of the top events through the SET of Figure 5-3 to 
obtain the Dempster-Shafer structure of the probability of each SDS. There are four SDS (OK, 
LOOP1, LOOP2 and CD) in SET (see Figure 5-3). The equations of the sequence probabilities are 
shown in Table 5-4. The conditional probability of core damage directly induced by seismic (SDS 
CD) is shown in Figure 5-8 as a function of the different possible PGA values. Notice that the 
  
 
conditional failure probability monotonically increases with the ground motion as in the curve 
obtained by traditional methods. 
 
Table 5-4 SDS equations 
Seismic Damage States Equation 
OK 1-OSP 
LOOP1 OSP*(1-EDG)*(1-CST)*(1-HP)*(1-LP) 
LOOP2 OSP*(1-EDG)*(1-CST)*HP*(1-LP) 
CD OSP*[1-(1-EDG)*(1-CST)*(1-LP)*(1-HP*SRV)] 
 
Figure 5-8: Dempster-Shafer structure for the probability of SDS CD 
The conditional probability curves of seismic initiating event LOOP1 are also shown in 
Figure 5-9. In this Figure, we can see that the conditional failure probability initially increases 
and, then, falls off with increasing PGA. This is due to the contribution of all the seismic initiating 
event sequences involving at least one safety system that operates successfully: the safety 
system success probabilities go to zero at high ground motions. 
 
Figure 5-9: Dempster-Shafer structure for the conditional probability of sequence LOOP1 
 
5.4 Conditional Probability of Core Damage Induced by Seismic Initiating Event Sequences 
This step quantifies the conditional probabilities of core damage induced by seismic 
initiating event sequences. In this step, the sequence probability curves for seismic initiating 
  
 
events (i.e. LOOP1 and LOOP2) have to be linked to the non-seismic event tree CCDP distribution 
bounds, so we need to build the Dempster-Shafer structure for the non-seismic event tree CCDP 
probability.  
Taking seismic initiating event LOOP1 as an example, we build the corresponding internal 
event tree as in Figure 5-10. System fault trees are also constructed according to the simplified 
plant layout of Figure 5-1 to evaluate the probabilities of failure of system HP, DP and LP. 
LOOP1 HP DP LP Seq # End State 
    1 OK 
    
    2 CD 
    
    3 OK 
    
    4 CD 
    
    5 CD 
    
Figure 5-10: Internal event tree corresponding to seismic initiating event LOOP1 
Before sequences quantification, we have to evaluate the failure probability for each safety 
system (headings HP, DP and LP) by means of the corresponding fault tree. For example, the HP 
fault tree (Figure 5-11) representing the logic of failure of the high pressure injection system, has 
to open two air-operated valves (AOV) and start the injection pump when receiving the 
auto-start signal: any of these components failing by demand and pump failing while running 
imply high pressure injection function failure. There are four basic events in the HP fault tree. 
The Dempster-Shafer structures for the failure probability of each basic component are 
constructed based on industry and plant data, (see Table 5-2) and then propagated through the 
fault tree to obtain the Dempster-Shafer structure for the failure probability of the safety 
system. 
 
Figure 5-11: The fault tree of heading HP 
According to the procedure already outlined in [14], first, we use the industry generic data 
to build the Dempster-Shafer structure for each basic event failure probability (Section 3.2). The 
5-th and 95-th percentiles are set as the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the uncertain 
probability ranges. The resulting belief and plausibility functions are shown in Figure 5-12 with 
  
 
reference to the AOV, only for illustration purposes. The predetermined (i.e. presumed) a priori 
beta function traditionally used in NPP PRAs to represent the AOV demand failure probability is 
also plotted in Figure 5-12, for comparison. 
 
Figure 5-12: The belief and plausibility functions for the AOV failure probability 
Then, the belief and plausibility functions constructed by means of the industry generic 
data are updated Bayesianly using the plant specific data available (Table 5-2). Thus, for Bayesian 
updating purposes, we transform the belief and plausibility functions into possibility 
distributions (Section 3.3). These possibility distributions are the prior possibility distributions 
used in the Bayesian update. As shown in Figure 5-13 with reference to the AOV failure 
probability, the left part of the prior possibility distribution coincides with the corresponding 
plausibility function, whereas the right part is equal to the complement of the corresponding 
belief function. 
The prior possibility distributions are updated using the plant specific data by Equation 
(3-12). Continuing with the example, the posterior possibility distribution of the AOV failure 
probability is shown in Figure 5-13, for comparison. It can be seen that after Bayesian update, 
the distribution is more peaked than before. 
 
Figure 5-13: Possibility distributions for the AOV failure probability before (dashed line) and 
after (solid line) the Bayesian update 
  
 
Finally, we reconvert the posterior possibility distribution of each basic event into belief and 
plausibility functions using Equations (3-10) and (3-11). Figure 5-14 shows the prior and 
posterior belief and plausibility functions for the AOV failure probability corresponding to the 
possibility distribution of Figure 5-13. 
 
Figure 5-14: The prior and posterior probability bounds for the AOV failure probability 
Once the Dempster-Shafer structures of the failure probability of all the basic events are 
built, they are propagated by the Monte Carlo simulation through the system internal event tree 
to obtain the Dempster-Shafer structure of the CCDP of seismic initiating events. The Monte 
Carlo uncertainty propagation for the LOOP1 CCDP is shown in Figure 5-15. In addition, for 
comparison purposes Figure 5-15 also reports the CCDP distributions obtained with the 
traditional Monte Carlo simulation using single (presumed and subjective) probability 
distributions for the basic events probabilities. 
 
Figure 5-15: The CCDP bounds for seismic initiating event LOOP1 
To construct the conditional probability intervals of core damage induced by the seismic 
initiating event of interest, we have to combine the Dempster-Shafer structure for each seismic 
initiating event (i.e. LOOP1 and LOOP2) with their associated CCDP bound. Again obtained by 
the MCS, the conditional probabilities of core damage induced by LOOP1 are shown as a 
function of PGA values in Figure 5-16. 
  
 
 
Figure 5-16: The CCDP induced by LOOP1 as a function of different PGA values 
 
5.5 Core Damage Probability 
The probability curves of core damage induced by seismic initiating events are then 
combined with the sequence level fragility curves of core damage due directly to the seismic 
event in order to get the plant level core damage fragility curves (Figure 5-17): this means that 
for each ground motion value, the total conditional probability of core damage is obtained as CDPtotal	=CDPLOOP1+CDPLOOP	2+CDPseismic.  
 
Figure 5-17: Total conditional probability of core damage 
 
5.6 Core Damage Frequency 
The final step is the estimation of the CDF. The total conditional probability curves for core 
damage are combined with the seismic hazard curves to complete the seismic risk assessment. 
The conditional probability bounds of core damage are obtained by sampling the PGA intervals 
constructed in Section 5.1. Figure 5-18 shows the final results and compares them with the 
traditional results obtained by employing the 50% hazard curve and mean component fragility 
curves. 
  
 
 
Figure 5-18: CDF results 
We can see that a part of the traditional CDF result is not bounded by the bounding 
analysis. There are two reasons for this: first, the conditional probability of failure calculated by 
the mean component fragility curve is larger than 95% when ground motion value is small; 
second, using the 50% hazard curve neglects some contribution of low magnitude ground 
motion.  
 
  
  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The American Nuclear Society has developed a national standard [22] which provides 
requirements of three Capability Categories for conducting Probabilistic Risk Assessment of 
seismic events: Capability Category I can rely on generic or regional mean seismic hazard 
estimates and only a calculation of the mean CDF. Capability Category II requires a more 
thorough seismic hazard analysis and a full uncertainty analysis of the risk quantification. 
Capability Category III follows along the lines of the Seismic Safety Margin Research Program [23] 
and is likely considered only in a research program. In most practical cases, a calculation of the 
mean CDF (Capability Category I) is accepted to determine any changes in risk or in addressing 
Generic Safety Issues. For example, only a mean CDF estimate is required in IPEEE (Individual 
Plant Examinations of External Events) and, therefore, almost all of the IPEEE SPRA submittals 
would only comply with this requirement.  
On the contrary, for confident decision making, more information is needed, in particular, 
addressing the (aleatory and epistemic) uncertainties affecting the SPRA.  
The principal purpose of assessing uncertainty is to provide a reasonable assurance that the 
decisions are robust and would therefore not warrant reconsideration. In order to overcome the 
existing drawbacks of the traditional uncertainty analysis approaches in SPRA context, a DST 
framework for handling uncertainties has been proposed in this paper. This approach allows a 
representation and propagation of uncertainties that are coherent with the often limited 
information available on the system, and do not require arbitrary and subjective assumptions 
and distributions. In this paper, a demonstration of how to treat uncertainty using DST in SPRA 
has been given with reference to a simplified NPP. The procedure for building the 
Dempster-Shafer structures on the uncertain parameters based on generic data has been shown, 
the Bayesian updating based on specific data has also been introduced. The results have shown 
that the approach is feasible and effective in (i) describing and jointly propagating aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties in SPRA models and (ii) providing ‘conservative’ bounds on the safety 
quantities of interest (i.e. CDF) that reflect the (limited) state of knowledge of the experts about 
the system of interest. On the other hand, the presence of (possibly wide) uncertainty bounds 
makes the decision making process difficult, and this will be solved in future work. 
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